Independence of irrelevant alternatives

Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is an axiom of decision theory which codifies the intuition that a choice between and should not depend on the quality of a third, unrelated outcome . There are several different variations of this axiom, which are generally equivalent under mild conditions. As a result of its importance, the axiom has been independently rediscovered in various forms across a wide variety of fields, including economics,[1] cognitive science, social choice,[1] fair division, rational choice, artificial intelligence, probability,[2] and game theory. It is closely tied to many of the most important theorems in these fields, including Arrow's impossibility theorem, the Balinski-Young theorem, and the money pump arguments.

In behavioral economics, failures of IIA (caused by irrationality) are called menu effects or menu dependence.[3]

  1. ^ a b Peters, Hans; Wakker, Peter (1991). "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences". Econometrica. 59 (6): 1787–1801. doi:10.2307/2938291. hdl:1765/23217. ISSN 0012-9682. JSTOR 2938291.
  2. ^ Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone; Lindberg, Per Olov; Maccheroni, Fabio; Marinacci, Massimo; Rustichini, Aldo (2021-09-01). "A canon of probabilistic rationality". Journal of Economic Theory. 196: 105289. arXiv:2007.11386. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2021.105289. ISSN 0022-0531.
  3. ^ Sniderman, Paul M.; Bullock, John (2018). "A Consistency Theory of Public Opinion and Political Choice: The Hypothesis of Menu Dependence". In Saris, Willem E.; Sniderman, Paul M. (eds.). Studies in Public Opinion: Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement Error, and Change. Princeton University Press. pp. 337–358. doi:10.2307/j.ctv346px8.16. ISBN 978-0-691-18838-6. JSTOR j.ctv346px8.16.