Indo-Pakistani war of 1965

Indo–Pakistani war of 1965
Pakistani AMX-13 (1965 War)
Top, bottom:
Indian soldiers with a destroyed Pakistani M4A1 Sherman tank
Pakistani soldiers maneuvering a captured Indian AMX-13 tank
Date5 August – 23 September 1965
(1 month, 2 weeks and 4 days)
Location
Result

Stalemate

Territorial
changes		 No territorial changes per ceasefire terms
Belligerents
 India  Pakistan
Commanders and leaders
Lal Bahadur Shastri
Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri
Arjan Singh
Joginder Dhillon
Harbaksh Singh
Har Kishan Sibal
Z. C. Bakshi		 Muhammad Ayub Khan
Muhammad Musa
Nur Khan
A. H. Malik
Yahya Khan
Abrar Hussain
S. M. Anwar
Strength

700,000 infantry (whole army)[2]
700+ aircraft[3]
720 tanks[2]

628 Artillery[4]

Effective strength on the West Pakistan Border[5]

  • 9 infantry divisions (4 under-strength)
  • 3 armoured brigades

260,000 infantry (whole army)[2]
280 aircraft[3]
~950 tanks[6]

  • 330-350 M47 Pattons delivered between 1955–60,
  • ~200 M48 Pattons delivered between 1961–64 [6] [7] [8]
  • 308 Shermans[4]
  • 96 Chaffees[4]

552 Artillery[4]

  • 72x 105mm How[4]
  • 234x 25pdr[4]
  • 126x 155mm How[4]
  • 48x 8" How[4]
  • 72x 3.7" How[4]
  • AK Lt Btys[4]

Effective strength on the West Pakistan Border[5]

  • 6 infantry divisions
  • 2 armoured divisions
Casualties and losses

Neutral claims[9][10]

Neutral claims[9]

  • 3,800 men[9]
  • 200[9]-300 Tanks[11] (At least 200+ confirmed losses, judging by the number of war trophies captured by the Indians)
  • 20 aircraft[9]
  • Over 1,840 km2 (710 mi2) of territory lost (in Sindh, Lahore, Sialkot, and Kashmir sectors)[12][13]

The Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, also known as the second India–Pakistan war, was an armed conflict between Pakistan and India that took place from August 1965 to September 1965. The conflict began following Pakistan's unsuccessful Operation Gibraltar,[14] which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against Indian rule.[15] The seventeen day war caused thousands of casualties on both sides and witnessed the largest engagement of armoured vehicles and the largest tank battle since World War II.[16][17] Hostilities between the two countries ended after a ceasefire was declared through UNSC Resolution 211 following a diplomatic intervention by the Soviet Union and the United States, and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration.[18] Much of the war was fought by the countries' land forces in Kashmir and along the border between India and Pakistan. This war saw the largest amassing of troops in Kashmir since the Partition of India in 1947, a number that was overshadowed only during the 2001–2002 military standoff between India and Pakistan. Most of the battles were fought by opposing infantry and armoured units, with substantial backing from air forces, and naval operations.

India had the upper hand over Pakistan when the ceasefire was declared.[19][20][21][22][23][24][25] However, in terms of aerial warfare, the PAF managed an upper hand over the combat zones despite being numerically inferior.[26][27][28][29] Although the two countries fought to a standoff, the conflict is seen as a strategic and political defeat for Pakistan,[30][20][31][32][33][34][35] as it had not succeeded in fomenting an insurrection in Kashmir and was instead forced to shift gears in the defence of Lahore.[36] India also failed to achieve its objective of military deterrence and did not capitalise on its advantageous military situation before the ceasefire was declared.[37][38][39]

Internationally, the war was viewed in the context of the greater Cold War, and resulted in a significant geopolitical shift in the subcontinent.[40] Before the war, the United States and the United Kingdom had been major material allies of both India and Pakistan, as their primary suppliers of military hardware and foreign developmental aid. During and after the conflict, both India and Pakistan felt betrayed by the perceived lack of support by the western powers for their respective positions; those feelings of betrayal were increased with the imposition of an American and British embargo on military aid to the opposing sides.[40][41] As a consequence, India and Pakistan openly developed closer relationships with the Soviet Union and China, respectively.[41] The perceived negative stance of the western powers during the conflict, and during the 1971 war, has continued to affect relations between the West and the subcontinent. Despite improved relations with the US and Britain since the end of the Cold War, the conflict generated a deep distrust of both countries within the subcontinent which to an extent lingers until now.[42][43][44]

  1. ^ Nordeen, Lon O. (1985), Air Warfare in the Missile Age, Smithsonian Institution Press, pp. 68–69, ISBN 978-0-87474-680-8, archived from the original on 7 February 2023
  2. ^ a b c d e f Rakshak, Bharat. "Page 15" (PDF). Official History. Times of India. Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 June 2011. Retrieved 14 July 2011.
  3. ^ a b T. V. Paul 1994, p. 107.
  4. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p Singh, Harbaksh (1991). War Despatches. New Delhi: Lancer International. p. 124. ISBN 978-81-7062-117-1.
  5. ^ a b Rakshak, Bharat. "Page 14" (PDF). Official History. Times of India. Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 June 2011. Retrieved 14 July 2011.
  6. ^ a b "M48 Patton vs Centurion: Indo-Pakistani War 1965 - Osprey Duel 71, Page 36".
  7. ^ THE M47 AND M48 PATTON TANKS - Osprey New Vanguard 31 by STEVEN J. ZALOGA, Page 22
  8. ^ The 1965 War. A Summary by Major Agha Humayun Amin - Analysis
  9. ^ a b c d e f g h Thomas M. Leonard (2006). Encyclopedia of the developing world. Taylor & Francis. pp. 806–. ISBN 978-0-415-97663-3. Archived from the original on 5 February 2023. Retrieved 14 April 2011.
  10. ^ "Indo-Pakistan Wars". Archived from the original on 8 May 2009.
  11. ^ a b Tucker, Spencer (2004). Tanks: An Illustrated History of Their Impact. ABC-CLIO. p. 172. ISBN 978-1-57607-995-9. Archived from the original on 5 February 2023. Retrieved 15 November 2015.
  12. ^ a b Praagh 2003, p. 294.
  13. ^ a b Jamal, Shadow War 2009, p. 86.
  14. ^ Montgomery, Evan Braden (24 May 2016). In the Hegemon's Shadow: Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-1-5017-0400-0. Archived from the original on 7 February 2023. Retrieved 22 September 2021.
  15. ^ Hali, S. M. (2011). "Operation Gibraltar – an unmitigated disaster?". Defence Journal. 15 (1–2): 10–34 – via EBSCO.
  16. ^ David R. Higgins 2016.
  17. ^ Rachna Bisht 2015.
  18. ^ Lyon, Peter (2008). Conflict between India and Pakistan: an encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. p. 82. ISBN 978-1-57607-712-2. Archived from the original on 7 February 2023. Retrieved 30 October 2011.
  19. ^ Dijink, Gertjan (2002). National Identity and Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-77129-5. The superior Indian forces, however, won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts.
  20. ^ a b McGarr 2013, p. 331.
  21. ^ Pakistan: The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. Library of Congress Country Studies, United States of America. April 1994. Archived from the original on 7 January 2016. Retrieved 2 October 2010. "Losses were relatively heavy—on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan."
  22. ^ Hagerty, Devin (2005). South Asia in world politics. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 26. ISBN 978-0-7425-2587-0. Archived from the original on 7 February 2023. Retrieved 12 November 2020. Quote: The invading Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts of Lahore, Pakistan's second-largest city. By the time the United Nations intervened on 20 September, Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat.
  23. ^ Wolpert, Stanley (2005). India (3rd ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press. p. 235. ISBN 978-0-520-24696-6. Archived from the original on 17 January 2023. Retrieved 15 November 2015. Quote: India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.
  24. ^ Kux, Dennis (1992). India and the United States : Estranged democracies, 1941–1991. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press. p. 238. ISBN 978-0-7881-0279-0. Archived from the original on 17 January 2023. Retrieved 15 November 2015. Quote: India had the best of the war.
  25. ^ "Asia: Silent Guns, Wary Combatants". Time. 1 October 1965. Archived from the original on 7 January 2016. Retrieved 30 August 2013. India, by contrast, is still the big gainer in the war. Alternate link content.time.com
  26. ^ Jogindar Singh (1993). Behind the Scene:An Analysis of India's Military Operations, 1947-1971. p. 238. In the final analysis Pakistan maintained air superiority over the combat zones from 6 September onwards
  27. ^ John Andreas Olsen (2018). Routledge Handbook of Air Power. Routledge. Careful analysis available in the public domain tends to list IAF losses as sixty-five aircraft to all causes and PAF losses at twenty-five aircraft….Finally, there was agreement that the losses suffered by the IAF were not commensurate with the value gained in terms of the effect on the adversary and its combat efficiency.
  28. ^ Kaushik Roy (2017). Conventional Warfare in South Asia, 1947 to the present. Routledge. point that the PAF's superior strategy enabled it to win air superiority by 5 September bears serious consideration. The preemptive air strike over the Indian air fields and the subsequent provocation of the IAF to fight over the heavily defended Pakistani airfields did indeed result in heavy attrition of the IAF's aircraft.
  29. ^ Jeremy Black (2016). Air Power:A Global History. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. ISBN 9781442250970. In the brief 1965 war between India and Pakistan, the two air forces were heavily engaged. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was able to inflict greater casualties despite being smaller. This owed much to the technical superiority of the PAF's F-86 Sabres over the IAF's Hunters and Mysteres.
  30. ^ Kux, Dennis (2006). India-Pakistan Negotiations: Is Past Still Prologue?. US Institute of Peace Press. p. 30. ISBN 978-1-929223-87-9. The conflict was short, but nasty. After seventeen days, both sides accepted a UN Security Council call for a cease-fire. Although the two militaries fought to a standoff, India won by not losing.
  31. ^ Small, Andrew (2015). The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics. Oxford University Press. p. 17. ISBN 978-0-19-021075-5. "... the war itself was a disaster for Pakistan, from the first failed attempts by Pakistani troops to precipitate an insurgency in Kashmir to the appearance of Indian artillery within range of Lahore International Airport."
  32. ^ Cite error: The named reference Conley was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  33. ^ Profile of Pakistan Archived 2 August 2018 at the Wayback Machine – U.S. Department of State, Failure of U.S.'s Pakistan Policy Archived 12 July 2010 at the Wayback Machine – Interview with Steve Coll
  34. ^ Speech of Bill McCollum Archived 4 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine in United States House of Representatives 12 September 1994
  35. ^ South Asia in World Politics By Devin T. Hagerty, 2005 Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN 0-7425-2587-2, p. 26
  36. ^ McGarr 2013, p. 315.
  37. ^ Ganguly, Sumit (1990) [Published online: 24 Jan 2008]. "Deterrence failure revisited: The Indo-Pakistani war of 1965". Journal of Strategic Studies. 13 (4): 77–93. doi:10.1080/01402399008437432. ISSN 0140-2390.
  38. ^ Tarapore, Arzan (2023) [Published online: 1 Oct 2019]. "Defence without deterrence: India's strategy in the 1965 war". Journal of Strategic Studies. 46 (1): 150–179. doi:10.1080/01402390.2019.1668274. ISSN 0140-2390. S2CID 211312207.
  39. ^ Awan, Ayesha Azmat (7 September 2022). "Looking back at India's failed strategy in 1965 War". Global Village Space. Retrieved 27 July 2023.
  40. ^ a b Riedel, Bruce (2013). Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back. Brookings Institution Press. pp. 67–70. ISBN 978-0-8157-2408-7.
  41. ^ a b McGarr 2013, pp. 324–326.
  42. ^ McGarr 2013, pp. 350–353.
  43. ^ McGarr 2013, pp. 360–363.
  44. ^ Riedel, Bruce (2013). Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back. Brookings Institution Press. pp. 69–70. ISBN 978-0-8157-2408-7. "The legacy of the Johnson arms cut-off remains alive today. Indians simply do not believe that America will be there when India needs military help … the legacy of the U.S. “betrayal” still haunts U.S.-Pakistan relations today."