Institutionalist political economy

Institutionalist political economy, also known as institutional political economy or IPE, refers to a body of political economy, thought to stem from the works of institutionalists such as Thorstein Veblen,[1] John Commons,[2] Wesley Mitchell and John Dewey. It emphasizes the impact of historical and socio-political factors on the evolution of economic practices, often opposing more rational approaches.[3] In the political sense, this implies the influences actors like the state have on socio-economic practices and the shaping of institutions via political decision-making.[4]

Relevant variables for the study of political institutions include the structures that indicate voting rules, the political system, preferences and ideological leanings of leaders.[5]

  1. ^ D.R. Scott, "Veblen not an Institutional Economist." The American Economic Review. Vol. 23. No.2. June 1933. pp. 274–77.
  2. ^ Rutherford, Malcolm (1983). "J. R. Commons's Institutional Economics". Journal of Economic Issues. 17 (3): 721–744. doi:10.1080/00213624.1983.11504151. JSTOR 4225342.
  3. ^ Cite error: The named reference Chang was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  4. ^ Cite error: The named reference Campbell was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  5. ^ Beck, Thorsten; Clarke, George; Groff, Alberto; Keefer, Philip; Walsh, Patrick (2001). "New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions". The World Bank Economic Review. 15 (1): 165–176. doi:10.1093/wber/15.1.165. hdl:10986/17216. JSTOR 3990075.