Italian Instrument of Surrender

Instrument of Surrender
The Additional Conditions for the Armistice with Italy
The Instrument of Surrender of Italy
Marshal Pietro Badoglio (at left) and General Dwight D Eisenhower (at right) with Lord Gort[a], Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder[b], Lt. Gen. Sir Noel Mason-MacFarlane[c], and General Harold Alexander[d], aboard the British battleship HMS Nelson prior to the signing of the surrender document at Malta.
TypeCapitulation
Signed29 September 1943
LocationMalta, aboard the British battleship HMS Nelson
ConditionSigned
AmendmentAmended by protocol on November 9, 1943
Replaced byTreaty of peace of February 10, 1947
Signatories
Parties
Ratifiers
Kingdom of Italy Government of Italy
Allied Governments

The Additional Conditions for the Armistice with Italy (Italian: Condizioni aggiuntive di armistizio con l'Italia), or the Instrument of Surrender of Italy as referred by the Allies, was a legal document which was signed between Italy and the Allies at Malta on 29 September 1943.[1]

It was signed by Marshal Pietro Badoglio for Italy, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower for the Allies, at Malta aboard the British battleship HMS Nelson. The term Additional Conditions for the Armistice with Italy was coined by the Italians as they had already signed the Armistice of Cassibile, an armistice ending the hostilities between Italy and the Allies, on 3 September.[2] The agreement signed at Malta is considered to be the 'longer' version of the armistice. For the Allies, it was considered the Instrument of Surrender of Italy.


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  1. ^ Garland, Albert N; Smyth, Howard McGaw (1965). Sicily and the Surrender of Italy. United States Army in World War II: Mediterranean Theater of Operations. p. 559. Appendix D
  2. ^ Smyth, Howard McGaw (Spring 1948), "The Armistice of Cassibile", Military Affairs, 12 (1): 12–35, doi:10.2307/1982522, JSTOR 1982522