JNIM-ISGS war

The JNIM-ISGS war is an ongoing armed conflict between Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State – Sahil Province (ISGS), the Sahelian branches of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State respectively. Since ISGS' formation in October 2016 and the creation of the JNIM coalition in 2017, the two groups had been described as the Sahelien exception or Sahelien anomaly: despite the global war between al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates since the latter's splinter from the former in 2014, both ISGS and JNIM have ignored each other and in rare cases worked together against Malian, Nigerien, Burkinabe, French, and international governments and non-Islamist militias until 2020.^[2]

The first ideological split between the two groups began in early 2019, but intensified in the summer 2020 due to a variety of factors.^[3][2] JNIM press releases in 2019 attempted to mend the split between the two jihadists groups and called for unity, but by early 2020, JNIM began calling the ISGS "khawarij", a pejorative term for a historical group of Muslims. This ideological split was fueled by more confrontational propaganda after ISGS became an official province of the Islamic State under ISWAP in early 2019, and propaganda outlets fell under ISWAP control.^[4][2] ISGS referred to JNIM leaders Iyad Ag Ghaly and Amadou Koufa as allied with the Malian government to fight the ISGS, and accused them of starting a war.^[5] Issues between the treatment of the local population and minority groups also differed between the two groups, and both ISGS and JNIM championed themselves as protectors of Fulani.^[6]

Clashes first broke out in March 2019, with attempted negotiations to reconnect the two groups occurring in June and October of that year.^[2][7] By January 2020, the war between the two groups was in full swing, and 125 clashes had been reported between the two groups and 415 fighters killed on both sides between 2019 and 2021.^[7] These clashes took place in eastern Mali's Ménaka and Gao regions and northern Burkina Faso.^[2] JNIM seized control of territories in these areas formerly controlled by ISGS with the exception of a few pockets, but ISGS expanded further into Niger and eastern Burkina Faso.

A significant operational difference between JNIM and ISGS is their civilian engagement strategy.^[8] According to Tammy Palacios, Senior Analyst & Manager of the Priority Sustainable Counterterrorism portfolio at the New Lines Institute and Modern War Institute at West Point Fellow - JNIM's territorial expansion is largely due to this civilian engagement strategy and differentiates the two groups in the region, in terms of their operational strategies.^[9] JNIM and ISGS are both lethal and do kill civilians, including by horrendous means such as beheading, but JNIM has demonstrated a more intentional restraint to killing civilians and have made civilian engagement core to their approach in maintaining and taking control of territory in the tri-state hot zone.^[8] Both JNIM and ISGS consider it a killable offense for a civilian[s] to share information or to collaborate with the other group or with state security or volunteer fighting forces and civilians are killed en mass for this offense - removed from transport busses at road checkpoints and killed, even killed at their places of domicile in the middle of the night.^[8]

In the ISGS' Ménaka offensive in 2022 and 2023, the group's attacks on minority groups and civilians alleged to be sympathetic to JNIM killed hundreds of civilians, and forced thousands to flee elsewhere.^[10] The clashes have also created a weakness in both groups, allowing them to be attacked by French, Malian, Nigerien, and Burkinabe forces.^[11]