John McDowell

This article is about the philosopher. For other uses, see John McDowell (disambiguation).

John McDowell
McDowell in 2007
Born
John Henry McDowell

(1942-03-07) 7 March 1942 (age 82)[7]
Boksburg, South Africa
Alma materUniversity College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (as issued by University of London)
New College, Oxford
Era20th-century philosophy
RegionWestern philosophy
SchoolPostanalytic philosophy
Pittsburgh School
Disjunctivism
Foundationalism[1][2]
Perceptual conceptualism[3]
Direct realism[4][2]
The New Wittgenstein
Aristotelian ethics
Hegelianism
Doctoral studentsAnita Avramides, Alice Crary
Other notable studentsSebastian Rödl
Main interests
Metaphysics, epistemology, logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of perception, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of mind, ethics, meta-ethics
Notable ideas
Perceptual conceptualism[3] naturalized Platonism,[5] moral particularism,[6] disjunctivism
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John Henry McDowell FBA (born 7 March 1942) is a South African philosopher, formerly a fellow of University College, Oxford, and now university professor at the University of Pittsburgh. Although he has written on metaphysics, epistemology, ancient philosophy, nature, and meta-ethics, McDowell's most influential work has been in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. McDowell was one of three recipients of the 2010 Andrew W. Mellon Foundation's Distinguished Achievement Award,[8] and is a Fellow of both the American Academy of Arts & Sciences and the British Academy.

McDowell has, throughout his career, understood philosophy to be "therapeutic" and thereby to "leave everything as it is" (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations), which he understands to be a form of philosophical quietism (although he does not consider himself to be a "quietist"). The philosophical quietist believes that philosophy cannot make any explanatory comment about how, for example, thought and talk relate to the world but can, by offering re-descriptions of philosophically problematic cases, return the confused philosopher to a state of intellectual perspicacity.

However, in defending this quietistic perspective McDowell has engaged with the work of leading contemporaries in such a way as to therapeutically dissolve what he takes to be philosophical error, while defending major positions and interpretations from major figures in philosophical history, and developing original and distinctive theses about language, mind and value. In each case, he has tried to resist the influence of what he regards as a scientistic, reductive form of philosophical naturalism that has become very commonplace in our historical moment, while nevertheless defending a form of "Aristotelian naturalism,[9]" bolstered by key insights from Hegel, Wittgenstein, and others.

  1. ^ John McDowell, Mind and World. Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 29.
  2. ^ a b Roger F. Gibson, "McDowell's Direct Realism and Platonic Naturalism", Philosophical Issues Vol. 7, Perception (1996), pp. 275–281.
  3. ^ a b McDowell, J. (2007). "What Myth?". Inquiry. 50 (4): 338–351. doi:10.1080/00201740701489211. S2CID 214653941.
  4. ^ John McDowell, Mind and World. Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 26.
  5. ^ Genova, A. C. (2 March 2003). "Review of Reading McDowell on Mind and World". Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. ISSN 1538-1617.
  6. ^ McDowell, J., 1979, "Virtue and Reason", The Monist, 62: 331–50.
  7. ^ John McDowell – Philosophy – University of Pittsburgh Archived 3 June 2013 at the Wayback Machine
  8. ^ "Pitt Scholar Honored With Mellon Foundation Distinguished Achievement Award, $1.5 Million Grant for Putting Human Nature Back in Philosophy".
  9. ^ McDowell, John (1995). Two Sorts of Naturalism. Clarendon Press.