Judicial minimalism

This article is about judicial philosophy. For other uses, see Minimalism (disambiguation).

Judicial minimalism refers to a philosophy in United States constitutional law which promotes itself as a politically moderate viewpoint such as that of retired Judge Sandra Day O'Connor. It is often compared to other judicial philosophies such as judicial activism, judicial originalism, and judicial textualism. Judicial minimalism takes its approach from a limited method of decision-making conceived by Edmund Burke.[1]

Originally stated in Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration (1885),[2] minimalism is one the seven rules of the constitutional avoidance doctrine established in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1936) that requires that the Supreme Court of the United States to "not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'"[3][4]

  1. ^ Ball, Terence (1994-11-24), "Constitutional Interpretation: What's Wrong With 'Original Intent'?", Reappraising Political Theory, Oxford University Press, pp. 250–272, doi:10.1093/0198279957.003.0011, ISBN 978-0-19-827995-2
  2. ^ Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)
  3. ^ Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)
  4. ^ Nolan, Andrew (September 2, 2014). The Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance: A Legal Overview (Report). Congressional Research Service. p. 9. Archived from the original on December 30, 2023. Retrieved December 27, 2023.