Lesser-evil voting

Lesser-evil voting (LEV) refers to a kind of strategic voting where a voter supports a less-preferred candidate in an election (the "lesser evil") rather than their actual favorite candidate, when this candidate is unlikely to win.[1]

Electoral systems where lesser-evil voting is forced, i.e., where it is not possible for a voter to support both their favorite candidate and a lesser-evil without causing the "greater evil" to win, necessarily fail the sincere favorite criterion. If the incentive is sufficiently severe, such methods are also subject to Duverger's law, tending to devolve into two-party systems.[2] Lesser-evil voting is a common strategy in plurality-based systems like first-past-the-post and ranked-choice voting (RCV),[3] but not approval or score voting.[4]

  1. ^ Rosen, Sanford (27 September 2012). "Obama's Re-Election: The Lesser Evil?". HuffPost. Retrieved 13 August 2024.
  2. ^ Duverger, Maurice (1972). "Factors in a Two-Party and Multiparty System". Party Politics and Pressure Groups. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell. pp. 23–32. a majority vote on one ballot is conducive to a two-party system ... a majority vote on two ballots is conducive to a multiparty system, inclined toward forming coalitions.
  3. ^ Dellis, Arnaud; Kröger, Sabine (2023). "How Do People Vote Under Instant Runoff Voting? An Experiment on Complexity and Voting Behavior". SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.4602773. ISSN 1556-5068.
  4. ^ Merrill, Samuel; Nagel, Jack (1987-06-01). "The Effect of Approval Balloting on Strategic Voting under Alternative Decision Rules". American Political Science Review. 81 (2): 509–524. doi:10.2307/1961964. ISSN 0003-0554. JSTOR 1961964.