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In social choice theory, the majority rule (MR) is a social choice rule which says that, when comparing two options (such as bills or candidates), the option preferred by more than half of the voters (a majority) should win.
In political philosophy, the majority rule is one of two major competing notions of democracy. The most common alternative is given by the utilitarian rule (or other welfarist rules), which identify the spirit of liberal democracy with the equal consideration of interests.[1] Although the two rules can disagree in theory, political philosophers beginning with James Mill have argued the two can be reconciled in practice, with majority rule being a valid approximation to the utilitarian rule whenever voters share similarly-strong preferences.[1][2] This position has found strong support in many social choice models, where the socially-optimal winner and the majority-preferred winner often overlap.[3][4]
Majority rule is the most common social choice rule worldwide, being heavily used in deliberative assemblies for dichotomous decisions, e.g. whether or not to pass a bill.[5] Mandatory referendums where the question is yes or no are also generally decided by majority rule.[6] It is one of the basic rules of parliamentary procedure, as described in handbooks like Robert's Rules of Order.[1]
- ^ a b c Ball, Terence and Antis Loizides, "James Mill", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- ^ Jean-François Laslier (2011). And the loser is... Plurality Voting. ISBN 978-3-642-42955-2. ISSN 2267-828X. Wikidata Q108664719.
{{cite book}}:|journal=ignored (help) - ^ Pivato, Marcus (2015-08-01). "Condorcet meets Bentham" (PDF). Journal of Mathematical Economics. 59: 58–65. doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.04.006. ISSN 0304-4068.
We show that if the statistical distribution of utility functions in a population satisfies a certain condition, then a Condorcet winner will not only exist, but will also maximize the utilitarian social welfare function.
- ^ Krishna, Vijay; Morgan, John (2015). "Majority Rule and Utilitarian Welfare". American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 7 (4): 339–375. doi:10.1257/mic.20140038. ISSN 1945-7669. JSTOR 43949040.
- ^ Anthony J. McGann (2002). "The Tyranny of the Supermajority: How Majority Rule Protects Minorities" (PDF). Center for the Study of Democracy. Retrieved 2008-06-09.
{{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires|journal=(help) - ^ Vatter, Adrian (2000). "Consensus and direct democracy:Conceptual and empirical linkages". European Journal of Political Research. 38 (2): 171–192. doi:10.1023/A:1007137026336.