McDonnell Douglas v. Green | |
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Argued March 28, 1973 Decided May 14, 1973 | |
Full case name | McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green |
Citations | 411 U.S. 792 (more) 93 S. Ct. 1817; 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 |
Case history | |
Prior | Green v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Mo. 1970); 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1970); cert. granted, 409 U.S. 1036 (1972). |
Subsequent | On remand, Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 390 F. Supp. 501 (E.D. Mo. 1975); affirmed, 528 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1976). |
Court membership | |
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Case opinion | |
Majority | Powell, joined by unanimous |
Laws applied | |
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 |
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), is a US employment law case by the United States Supreme Court regarding the burdens and nature of proof in proving a Title VII case and the order in which plaintiffs and defendants present proof. It was the seminal case in the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a United States federal law that prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. After the Supreme Court ruling, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Pub. L. 102-166) amended several sections of Title VII.[1]
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination "because of" certain reasons. While "because of" may be understood in the conversational sense, the McDonnell Douglas case was the first landmark case to define this phrase.