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The median voter theorem in political science and social choice theory, developed by Duncan Black, states that if voters and candidates are distributed along a one-dimensional spectrum and voters have single-peaked preferences, any voting method that is compatible with majority-rule will elect the candidate preferred by the median voter.
The theorem was first set out by Duncan Black in 1948.[1] He wrote that he saw a large gap in economic theory concerning how voting determines the outcome of decisions, including political decisions. Black's paper triggered research on how economics can explain voting systems. In 1957 Anthony Downs expounded upon the median voter theorem in his book An Economic Theory of Democracy.[2]
A related assertion was made earlier (in 1929) by Harold Hotelling, who argued politicians in a representative democracy would converge to the viewpoint of the median voter,[3] basing this on his model of economic competition.[3][4] However, this assertion relies on a deeply simplified voting model, and is only partly applicable to systems satisfying the median voter property. It cannot be applied to systems like ranked choice voting (RCV) or first-past-the-post at all, even in two-party systems.[5][6][note 1]
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