Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts | |
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Argued November 10, 2008 Decided June 25, 2009 | |
Full case name | Luis E. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts |
Docket no. | 07-591 |
Citations | 557 U.S. 305 (more) 129 S.Ct. 2527; 174 L. Ed. 2d 314; 2009 U.S. LEXIS 4734 |
Case history | |
Prior | guilty; appeal rejected, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 1114, 870 N.E.2d 676 (2007)(unpublished); denying review, 449 Mass. 1113, 874 N.E.2d 407 (2007). |
Holding | |
Sworn affidavits are testimonial in nature, violate the Confrontation Clause under Crawford v. Washington (2004), and do not meet the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The requirements of the Confrontation Clause may not be relaxed because they make the prosecution's task burdensome. "Notice and demand" statutes are constitutional. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Scalia, joined by Stevens, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg |
Concurrence | Thomas |
Dissent | Kennedy, joined by Roberts, Breyer, Alito |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. VI; Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) |
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009),[1] is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that it was a violation of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation for a prosecutor to submit a chemical drug test report without the testimony of the person who performed the test.[2] While the court ruled that the then-common practice[3] of submitting these reports without testimony was unconstitutional, it also held that so called "notice-and-demand" statutes are constitutional. A state would not violate the Constitution through a "notice-and-demand" statute by both putting the defendant on notice that the prosecution would submit a chemical drug test report without the testimony of the scientist and also giving the defendant sufficient time to raise an objection.[4]