Mertens-stable equilibrium

In game theory, Mertens stability is a solution concept used to predict the outcome of a non-cooperative game. A tentative definition of stability was proposed by Elon Kohlberg and Jean-François Mertens[1] for games with finite numbers of players and strategies. Later, Mertens[2][3] proposed a stronger definition that was elaborated further by Srihari Govindan and Mertens.[4] This solution concept is now called Mertens stability, or just stability.

Like other refinements of Nash equilibrium[5] used in game theory stability selects subsets of the set of Nash equilibria that have desirable properties. Stability invokes stronger criteria than other refinements, and thereby ensures that more desirable properties are satisfied.

  1. ^ Kohlberg, Elon; Mertens, Jean-François (1986). "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria" (PDF). Econometrica. 54 (5): 1003–1037. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.295.4592. doi:10.2307/1912320. JSTOR 1912320.
  2. ^ Mertens, Jean-François (1989). "Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation Part I. Definition and basic properties". Mathematics of Operations Research. 14 (4): 575–625. doi:10.1287/moor.14.4.575. JSTOR 3689732.
  3. ^ Mertens, Jean-François (1991). "Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation Part II. Discussion of the definition, and further results". Mathematics of Operations Research. 16 (4): 694–753. doi:10.1287/moor.16.4.694. JSTOR 3689907.
  4. ^ Govindan, Srihari; Mertens, Jean-François (2004). "An Equivalent Definition of Stable Equilibria". International Journal of Game Theory. 32 (3): 339–357. doi:10.1007/s001820400165. hdl:10.1007/s001820400165.
  5. ^ Govindan, Srihari & Robert Wilson, 2008. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition. "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2010-06-20. Retrieved 2012-02-12.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)