Moral realism

For the book by Russ Shafer-Landau, see Moral Realism: A Defence.
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Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately. This makes moral realism a non-nihilist form of ethical cognitivism (which accepts that ethical sentences express propositions and can therefore be true or false) with an ontological orientation, standing in opposition to all forms of moral anti-realism[1] and moral skepticism, including ethical subjectivism (which denies that moral propositions refer to objective facts), error theory (which denies that any moral propositions are true), and non-cognitivism (which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all). Moral realism's two main subdivisions are ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism.[2]

Most philosophers claim that moral realism dates at least to Plato as a philosophical doctrine[3] and that it is a fully defensible form of moral doctrine.[4] A 2009 survey involving 3,226 respondents[5] found that 56% of philosophers accept or lean toward moral realism (28%: anti-realism; 16%: other).[6] A 2020 study found that 62.1% accept or lean toward realism.[7] Some notable examples of robust moral realists include David Brink,[8] John McDowell, Peter Railton,[9] Geoffrey Sayre-McCord,[10] Michael Smith, Terence Cuneo,[11] Russ Shafer-Landau,[12] G. E. Moore,[13] John Finnis, Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon,[14] Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, and Peter Singer. Norman Geras has argued that Karl Marx was a moral realist.[15] Moral realism's various philosophical and practical applications have been studied.[16]

  1. ^ "Moral Realism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy". www.iep.utm.edu. Retrieved 2020-05-28.
  2. ^ Dancy, Jonathan (2016), "Moral realism", Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1 ed.), Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-l059-1, ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6, retrieved 2020-05-28
  3. ^ Plato's Moral Realism: The Discovery of the Presuppositions of Ethics, by John M. Rist (Jul 15, 2012)
  4. ^ Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine, (New Directions in Ethics), by Matthew H. Kramer
  5. ^ "The PhilPapers Surveys". philpapers.org. Retrieved 21 December 2016.
  6. ^ PhilPapers survey, 2009, under the heading 'Meta-ethics'
  7. ^ "What Philosophers Believe: Results from the 2020 PhilPapers Survey | Daily Nous". November 2021.
  8. ^ Brink, David O., Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
  9. ^ Railton, Peter (1986). "Moral Realism". Philosophical Review. 95 (2): 163–207. doi:10.2307/2185589. JSTOR 2185589.
  10. ^ Sayre-McCord, Geoff (2005). "Moral Realism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (link)
  11. ^ Cuneo, Terence (2007). "The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism", Oxford.
  12. ^ Shafer-Landau, Russ (2003) "Moral Realism: A Defense", Oxford, ISBN 0-19-925975-5.
  13. ^ Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  14. ^ Sturgeon, Nicholas (1985). "Moral Explanations", in Morality, Reason, and Truth, edited by David Copp and David Zimmerman, Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, pp. 49-78.
  15. ^ Geras, Norman (1985). "The Controversy about Marx and Justice". New Left Review. 150: 47–85.
  16. ^ Praise and Blame: Moral Realism and Its Applications, (New Forum Books), by Daniel N. Robinson (Jul 29, 2002).