The Society of the Muslim Brothers (Arabic: جماعة الإخوان المسلمينJamāʿat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn), better known as the Muslim Brotherhood (الإخوان المسلمونal-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) is a transnational SunniIslamist organization founded in Egypt by Islamic scholar and schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna in 1928.[31] Al-Banna's teachings spread far beyond Egypt, influencing today various Islamist movements from charitable organizations to political parties.[32]
Initially, as a Pan-Islamic, religious, and social movement, it preached Islam in Egypt, taught the illiterate, and set up hospitals and business enterprises. It later advanced into the political arena, aiming to end British colonial control of Egypt. The movement's self-stated aim is the establishment of a state ruled by sharia law under a caliphate[33]–its most famous slogan is "Islam is the solution". Charity is a major aspect of its work.[1]
The group spread to other Muslim countries but still has one of its largest organizations in Egypt, despite a succession of government crackdowns from 1948 up until the present.[34] It remained a fringe group in the politics of the Arab World until the 1967 Six-Day War, when Islamism managed to replace popular secular Arab nationalism after a resounding Arab defeat by Israel.[35] The movement was also supported by Saudi Arabia, with which it shared mutual enemies like communism.[36]
The Arab Spring brought it legalization and substantial political power at first, but as of 2013 it has suffered severe reversals.[37] The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was legalized in 2011 and won several elections,[38] including the 2012 presidential election when its candidate Mohamed Morsi became Egypt's first president to gain power through an election.[39] A year later, following massive demonstrations and unrest, he was overthrown by the military and placed under house arrest; with a later review finding that the group failed to moderate its views or embrace democratic values during its time in power.[40] The group was then banned in Egypt and declared a terrorist organization. The Persian Gulf monarchies of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates followed suit, driven by the perception that the Brotherhood is a threat to their authoritarian rule.[41][failed verification]
The group's founder accepted the utility of political violence[42] and members of Brotherhood conducted assassinations and attempted assassinations on Egyptian state figures during his lifetime, including Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmud El Nokrashi in 1948.[43]Sayyid Qutb, one of the group's most prominent thinkers, promoted takfirism in Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq (Milestones), a doctrine that permits "the stigmatisation of other Muslims as infidel or apostate, and of existing states as unIslamic, and the use of extreme violence in the pursuit of the perfect Islamic society"; this doctrine continues to inspire many Jihadist movements.[44][45] The group abandoned the use of violence in the 1970s. However, Hamas, a Palestinian militant group that currently controls the Gaza Strip, is an off-shoot of the Brotherhood that continues to use violence. The Brotherhood itself claims to be a peaceful, democratic organization, and that its leader[who?] "condemns violence and violent acts".[46]
^R. Halverson, Jeffrey (2010). Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 62, 65. ISBN978-0-230-10279-8. Neo-Sufism assumed the basis of a secondary Athari tendency that we find in the thought of Hasan al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood... Neo-Sufism... was a major influence on the thought of Hasan al-Banna and the development of the Muslim Brotherhood..
^Sageman, Marc (2004). "Chapter 1: The Origins of the Jihad". Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 7. ISBN0-8122-3808-7.
^Lenz-Raymann, Kathrin (2014). "Chapter 3: Salafi Isalm: Social Transformation and Political Islam". Securitization of Islam: A Vicious Circle: Counter-Terrorism and Freedom of Religion in Central Asia. United Kingdom: Transcript Verlag. p. 80. ISBN978-3837629040. JSTORj.ctv1fxgjp.7.
^Chatterjee, Choi (2018). "10: Islamic Fundamentalism in Critical Perspective". The 20th Century: A Retrospective. New York: Routledge. p. 253. ISBN978-0-8133-2691-7.
^Drevon, Haenni, Jerome, Patrick (2021). How Global Jihad Relocalises and Where it Leads: The Case of HTS, the Former AQ Franchise in Syria. I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy: European University Institute. pp. 18, 29–31. ISSN1028-3625.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^Y. Zelin, Aaron (2022). "2: The Development of Political Jihadism". The Age of Political Jihadism: A Study of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. 1111 19th Street NW, Suite 500, Washington DC 20036, USA: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. p. 11. ISBN979-8-9854474-4-6.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
^Jenkins, John (2015). Muslim Brotherhood Review: Main Findings. London: British Parliament. p. 1. ISBN9781474127127. Hassan al Banna, called for the religious reformation of individual Muslims, the progressive moral purification of Muslim societies and their eventual political unification in a Caliphate under sharia law.
^Rutherford, Bruce (2008). Egypt After Mubarak. Princeton University Press. p. 99.
^Jenkins, John (2015). Muslim Brotherhood Review: Main Findings. London: British Parliament. p. 2. ISBN9781474127127. He concluded that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood did not do enough to demonstrate political moderation or a commitment to democratic values, had failed to convince Egyptians of their competence or good intentions, and had subsequently struggled to draw lessons for what its failure in Egypt meant for its future.
^Jenkins, John (2015). Muslim Brotherhood Review: Main Findings. London: British Parliament. p. 3. ISBN9781474127127. Hassan al Banna accepted the political utility of violence, and the Brotherhood conducted attacks, including political assassinations and attempted assassinations against Egyptian state targets and both British and Jewish interests during his lifetime;