Non-cooperative game theory

In game theory, a non-cooperative game is a game in which there are no external rules or binding agreements that enforce the cooperation of the players. A non-cooperative game is typically used to model a competitive environment. This is stated in various accounts most prominent being John Nash's 1951 paper in the journal Annals of Mathematics.^[1]

Counterintuitively, non-cooperative game models can be used to model cooperation as well, and vice versa, cooperative game theory can be used to model competition. Some examples of this would be the use of non-cooperative game models in determining the stability and sustainability of cartels and coalitions.^[2]^[3]

^ Nash, John (1951). "Non-Cooperative Games". Annals of Mathematics. 54 (2): 286–295. doi:10.2307/1969529. JSTOR 1969529.
^ Palsule-Desai, Omkar D. (March 2015). "Complete Versus Partial Collusion in Competing Coalitions". International Game Theory Review. 17 (1): 1540006. doi:10.1142/S021919891540006X.
^ Carraro, Carlo, ed. (2003). The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions. doi:10.4337/9781781009888. ISBN 978-1-78100-988-8.^{[page needed]}

[:7-1] Nash, John (1951). "Non-Cooperative Games". Annals of Mathematics. 54 (2): 286–295. doi:10.2307/1969529. JSTOR 1969529.

[2] Palsule-Desai, Omkar D. (March 2015). "Complete Versus Partial Collusion in Competing Coalitions". International Game Theory Review. 17 (1): 1540006. doi:10.1142/S021919891540006X.

[3] Carraro, Carlo, ed. (2003). The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions. doi:10.4337/9781781009888. ISBN 978-1-78100-988-8.^{[page needed]}

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