Operation Popeye (Brazil)

Operation Popeye
Part of the 1964 Brazilian coup d'état

The Minas Gerais column in Areal
Date31 March – 2 April 1964
Location
Result Rebel victory
Belligerents

Rebels:

Loyalists:

Commanders and leaders
  • Luís Tavares de Cunha Melo
  • Raimundo Ferreira
  • Kerensky Motta
Units involved
  • 4th Infantry Division
  • Tiradentes Detachment
  • 1st Infantry Division
  • 1st Battalion of Caçadores
Strength
At the beginning:[1]
  • 2,714 soldiers
  • 193 vehicles
At the end:[2]
  • 4–5,000 soldiers
  • 5,000 soldiers[3]
  • 300 men in the 1st BC[4]
  • 200 vehicles in the 1st RI[4]
  • 2,500 men in the 2nd RI[5]

Operation Popeye was the advance of the Tiradentes and Caicó detachments of the Brazilian Army and the Military Police of Minas Gerais (PMMG), from Minas Gerais, to Rio de Janeiro and Brasília during the 1964 Brazilian coup d'état. Their rearguard was protected within Minas Gerais by operations Cage and Silence. Ordered by general Olímpio Mourão Filho, from the 4th Military Region/Infantry Division, it was the coup's first military offensive. The Tiradentes Detachment, whose command was given to general Antônio Carlos Muricy, faced loyalist forces from the 1st Army in Rio de Janeiro's territory, under the command of general Luís Tavares da Cunha Melo, from 31 March 1964. The operation was one of the factors behind president João Goulart's departure from Rio de Janeiro and the collapse of loyalist resistance in the city; when the detachments entered Guanabara and Brasília on 2 April, the federal government had already been defeated.

Since 1963, Mourão Filho had been conspiring in Minas Gerais against the federal government, allied to his subordinate, general Carlos Luís Guedes, governor Magalhães Pinto and the PMMG, which was prepared to fight as a conventional force. Guedes and Magalhães Pinto had a more defensive plan, reinforced by negotiations with Espírito Santo for access to the sea, from where they could receive American logistical support. Mourão deemed this to be impractical, as the Minas Gerais garrison was much weaker than that of Rio de Janeiro. His solution was a surprise attack, gathering units from Juiz de Fora at night, entering Guanabara at dawn, arresting the president and taking over the Ministry of War. This was what the operation consisted of, but the original plan was never used, as Mourão launched the coup in the early hours of 31 March. What happened next was the gathering of the rebel forces and their meeting with the loyalists in the interior of Rio de Janeiro over the course of two days.

The operation took place along the Union and Industry highway, with the most important events in the stretch between the Paraibuna river, on Minas Gerais' border with Rio de Janeiro, and the city of Areal. The forces of the loyalist "military apparatus" had a full numerical and firepower advantage, and their victory was likely when only considering the military dimension. Its orders were defensive, and Goulart did not want to use the Air Force, which could have been decisive. Muricy was counting on the political dimension for support. On 31 March, before the arrival of the loyalists, the rebels already had a bridgehead over the Paraibuna, in the town of Monte Serrat. At night they were confronted by forces from the 1st Battalion of Caçadores (1st BC), coming from Petrópolis, under lieutenant colonel Kerensky Túlio Motta. Kerensky was forced to retreat after two of his platoons joined the rebels around midnight. Then, at 05:00, the powerful 1st Infantry Regiment (1st RI, the Sampaio Regiment), which was supposed to mount a defense on the Paraíba do Sul river, in Três Rios, joined the Tiradentes Detachment. Três Rios, unprotected, was taken at 10:30. Cunha Melo commanded the last line of defense, the 2nd RI, ahead of Areal. The fight approached on the afternoon of 1 April, but the possibility of confrontation was interrupted by news that Cunha Melo's superior, Armando de Moraes Âncora, commander of the 1st Army, would negotiate in Resende. Cunha Melo negotiated with Muricy, ceasing resistance and allowing his passage to Rio de Janeiro.

The operation took place in parallel with the 2nd Army's participation in the coup, which advanced against the 1st Army in the Paraíba Valley, and the events in Rio de Janeiro, together leading to the president's departure and loss of authority in Southeastern Brazil. This occurred while the Tiradentes Detachment was still in the interior of Rio de Janeiro, and the Ministry of War was taken over by general Costa e Silva before Mourão's arrival in Rio de Janeiro, frustrating his ambitions. The confrontation between the opposing forces, who were on the ground in combat positions but did not actually fight, was feared by local residents and reported in the press at the time as the scene of a hypothetical civil war.

  1. ^ Pinto 2015, p. 119.
  2. ^ Muricy 1981, p. 552.
  3. ^ Chagas 1985, p. 38.
  4. ^ a b Gomes 1964, p. 120.
  5. ^ Gomes 1964, p. 122.