Operation Summer '95

Operation Summer '95
Part of the Bosnian War and the
Croatian War of Independence

Map of Operation Summer '95
Date25–29 July 1995
Location
Result Croatian victory
Belligerents
 Croatia
 Herzeg-Bosnia
 Republika Srpska
Republic of Serbian Krajina
Commanders and leaders
Croatia Zvonimir Červenko
Croatia Ante Gotovina
Republika Srpska Ratko Mladić
Republika Srpska Radivoje Tomanić
Units involved
Croatian Army
Croatian Defence Council
Police of Herzeg-Bosnia
Republika Srpska Army of Republika Srpska
Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina
Strength
8,500 troops 5,500 troops
Casualties and losses
18 killed
155 wounded
Unknown
12,000–14,000 Bosnian Serb refugees

Operation Summer '95 (Croatian: Operacija Ljeto '95) was a joint military offensive of the Croatian Army (HV) and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) that took place north-west of the Livanjsko Polje, and around Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč in western Bosnia and Herzegovina. The operation was carried out between 25 and 29 July 1995, during the Croatian War of Independence and the Bosnian War. The attacking force of 8,500 troops commanded by HV's Lieutenant General Ante Gotovina initially encountered strong resistance from the 5,500-strong Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) 2nd Krajina Corps. The HV/HVO pushed the VRS back, capturing about 1,600 square kilometres (620 square miles) of territory and consequently intercepting the KninDrvar road—a critical supply route of the self-declared Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). The operation failed to achieve its declared primary goal of drawing VRS units away from the besieged city of Bihać, but it placed the HV in position to capture the RSK's capital Knin in Operation Storm days later.

Operation Summer '95 was launched in response to the resumption of attacks by the VRS and the RSK military on the Bihać pocket—one of six United Nations Safe Areas established in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The area was viewed as strategic to the Croatian military effort by the HV General Staff because it presented an obstacle to the supply of the RSK and it pinned down a portion of the RSK military, as well as some VRS forces that would otherwise have been redeployed. The international community feared the worst humanitarian disaster of the war to that point would occur if the RSK or the VRS overran the Bihać pocket. The United States, France and the United Kingdom were divided about the best way to protect the pocket.