Operation Whirlwind

Operation Whirlwind
Part of the Croatian War of Independence
Operation Whirlwind is located in Croatia
Operation Whirlwind bridgehead
Operation Whirlwind bridgehead

Operation Whirlwind bridgehead on the map of Croatia. JNA-held area in late December 1991 are highlighted red.
Date11–13 December 1991
Location
Banovina, Croatia
Result Yugoslav-SAO Krajina victory
Belligerents
 Croatia Yugoslavia Yugoslavia
SAO Krajina SAO Krajina
Commanders and leaders
Croatia Božo Budimir
Croatia Franc Ferenčak
Yugoslav People's Army Boško Džombić
Strength
~2,100 ~1,500
Casualties and losses
18 killed
18 wounded
20 killed
3 POW
1 missing

Operation Whirlwind (Croatian: Operacija Vihor)[1] was a failed Croatian Army (HV) offensive in the Banovina region of Croatia, fought from 11–13 December 1991, during the early stages of the Croatian War of Independence. The offensive employed a single infantry brigade as the main attacking force, supported by a bridging unit and a handful of tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Although the offensive met hardly any resistance in its initial stage, achieving tactical surprise, the operation was poorly planned, supported and executed as a result of limited training and combat experience. The offensive established a short-lived bridgehead, evacuated in panic two days after the operation commenced, under tank and mortar fire from the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) deployed north of Glina.

The operation was criticised for its poor planning and execution, insufficient preparation, reconnaissance and training, and inappropriate command and control methods applied by the Sisak Operational Group in charge of the offensive. It also lacked clear objectives. Afterwards, Croatian military authorities investigated the offensive, but found that there was very little written documentation, including written unit-level orders, pertaining to the operation. That led Admiral Davor Domazet-Lošo to conclude that the offensive was not formally authorised. The formal investigation did not specifically charge anyone with the failures, simply specifying the problems observed instead.

  1. ^ CIA 2002, p. 225