Participation criterion

The participation criterion, also called vote or population monotonicity, is a voting system criterion that says that a candidate should never lose an election as a result of receiving too many votes in support.[1] It says that adding more voters who prefer Alice to Bob should not cause Alice to lose the election to Bob.[2]

Voting systems that fail the participation criterion exhibit the no-show paradox, where a voter is effectively disenfranchised by the electoral system, because turning out to vote would make the outcome worse. In such a scenario, these voters' ballots are treated as "less than worthless", actively harming their own interests by reversing an otherwise-favorable outcome.[3]

Positional methods and score voting satisfy the participation criterion. All methods satisfying paired majority-rule[4][5] can fail in situations involving four-way cyclic ties, and the highest median methods[6] can fail in some situations. Most notably, instant-runoff voting and the two-round system—the most commonly-used voting rules worldwide—often fail the participation criterion in competitive elections.[7][8][9]

  1. ^ Doron, Gideon; Kronick, Richard (1977). "Single Transferrable Vote: An Example of a Perverse Social Choice Function". American Journal of Political Science. 21 (2): 303–311. doi:10.2307/2110496. ISSN 0092-5853. JSTOR 2110496.
  2. ^ Woodall, Douglas (December 1994). "Properties of Preferential Election Rules, Voting matters - Issue 3, December 1994".
  3. ^ Fishburn, Peter C.; Brams, Steven J. (1983-01-01). "Paradoxes of Preferential Voting". Mathematics Magazine. 56 (4): 207–214. doi:10.2307/2689808. JSTOR 2689808.
  4. ^ Moulin, Hervé (1988-06-01). "Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox". Journal of Economic Theory. 45 (1): 53–64. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(88)90253-0.
  5. ^ Brandt, Felix; Geist, Christian; Peters, Dominik (2016-01-01). "Optimal Bounds for the No-Show Paradox via SAT Solving". Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems. AAMAS '16. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: 314–322. arXiv:1602.08063. ISBN 9781450342391.
  6. ^ Markus Schulze (1998-06-12). "Regretted Turnout. Insincere = ranking". Retrieved 2011-05-14.
  7. ^ Doron, Gideon; Kronick, Richard (1977). "Single Transferrable Vote: An Example of a Perverse Social Choice Function". American Journal of Political Science. 21 (2): 303–311. doi:10.2307/2110496. ISSN 0092-5853. JSTOR 2110496.
  8. ^ McCune, David; Wilson, Jennifer (2024-04-07). "The Negative Participation Paradox in Three-Candidate Instant Runoff Elections". arXiv:2403.18857 [physics.soc-ph].
  9. ^ Ray, Depankar (1986-04-01). "On the practical possibility of a 'no show paradox' under the single transferable vote". Mathematical Social Sciences. 11 (2): 183–189. doi:10.1016/0165-4896(86)90024-7. ISSN 0165-4896.