Power analysis

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Power analysis is a form of side channel attack in which the attacker studies the power consumption of a cryptographic hardware device. These attacks rely on basic physical properties of the device: semiconductor devices are governed by the laws of physics, which dictate that changes in voltages within the device require very small movements of electric charges (currents). By measuring those currents, it is possible to learn a small amount of information about the data being manipulated.

Simple power analysis (SPA) involves visually interpreting power traces, or graphs of electrical activity over time. Differential power analysis (DPA) is a more advanced form of power analysis, which can allow an attacker to compute the intermediate values within cryptographic computations through statistical analysis of data collected from multiple cryptographic operations. SPA and DPA were introduced to the open cryptography community in 1998 by Paul Kocher, Joshua Jaffe and Benjamin Jun.^[1]