Preference falsification

Preference falsification is the act of misrepresenting a preference under perceived public pressures. It involves the selection of a publicly expressed preference that differs from the underlying privately held preference (or simply, a public preference at odds with one’s private preference). People frequently convey to each other preferences that differ from what they would communicate privately under credible cover of anonymity (such as in opinion surveys to researchers or pollsters).[1] Pollsters can use techniques such as list experiments[2] to uncover preference falsification.[3]

The term preference falsification was coined by Timur Kuran in a 1987 article, "Chameleon voters and public choice."[4] On controversial matters that induce preference falsification, he showed there, widely disliked policies may appear popular. The distribution of public preferences, which Kuran defines as public opinion, may differ greatly from private opinion, which is the distribution of private preferences known only to individuals themselves.

Kuran developed the implications of this observation in a 1995 book, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification.[5][6] This book argues that preference falsification is not only ubiquitous but has huge social and political consequences. It provides a theory of how preference falsification shapes collective illusions, sustains social stability, distorts human knowledge, and conceals political possibilities. Collective illusions is an occurrence when most people in a group go along with an idea or a preference that they don't agree with, because they incorrectly believe that most people in the group agree with it.[7]

  1. ^ Kuran 1995a, pp. 3–5.
  2. ^ Definition of list experiments
  3. ^ Philipp Chapkovski and Max Schaub (Apr 6, 2022). "Do Russians tell the truth when they say they support the war in Ukraine? Evidence from a list experiment". London School of Economics.
  4. ^ Kuran 1987, pp. 53–78.
  5. ^ Kuran 1995a.
  6. ^ Frank, Robert H. (1996). "The Political Economy of Preference Falsification: Timur Kuran's Private Truths, Public Lies". Journal of Economic Literature. 34 (1): 115–123. ISSN 0022-0515. JSTOR 2729412.
  7. ^ Rose, Todd (1 February 2022). Collective Illusions: Conformity, Complicity, and the Science of Why We Make Bad Decisions. Hachette Books. ISBN 978-0-306-92570-2.