Relations between Nazi Germany and the Arab world

Relations between Nazi Germany (1933–1945) and the Arab world ranged from indifference and confrontation to collaboration.^[1][2][3] Nazi Germany used collaborators and propaganda throughout the Arab world in search of alliance for their political goals.^[4][5] One foundation of such collaborations was the antisemitism of the Nazis, which was shared by some Arab and Muslim leaders, most notably the exiled Palestinian leader, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husseini. Another foundation was the Nazi hostility towards the United Kingdom and France which held colonies in the Arab World. This hostility was used in Nazi propaganda to allege an anti-colonial common interest that Nazi Germany held.^[6] However this interest conflicted with interests of Nazi Germany's allies who held colonies in the Arab world, namely Spain, Vichy France and Italy, and thus had to manage competing interests in the region.

One notable example was the Anglo-Iraqi War, when the Golden Square (a political clique of four generals led by Rashid Ali al-Gaylani) overthrew the pro-British 'Abd al-Ilah regency in Iraq and installed a pro-Axis government which was swiftly overthrown by British forces with the help of local Christian Assyrian levies.^[7][8][9] German Arabic propaganda was launched to stoke anti-Allied sentiment in the region.^[10] In 1941, the German Foreign Office noted:

'The Islamic concept of Holy War cannot be applied with the current distribution of powers. Arabism and Islam are not congruent. The Arabs that we have to take into account do not fight in favor of religious, but political goals. Matters of Islam need to be dealt with in a tactful manner."^[11]

In public and private, Adolf Hitler and Heinrich Himmler made complimentary statements about Islam as both a religion and a political ideology, describing it as a more disciplined, militaristic, political, and practical form of religion than Christianity is, and commending what they perceived were Muhammad's skills in politics and military leadership.^[12] Minor Nazi party branches were established in the Middle East before the war by local German diaspora.^[13] In June 1941, Wehrmacht High Command Directive No. 32 and the "Instructions for Special Staff F" designated Special Staff F as the Wehrmacht's central agency for all issues that affected the Arab world.^[14] Nazi Germany sent officials and military equipment to Middle Eastern forces fighting alongside Axis powers during the Middle East theatre of World War II.

Despite Amin al-Husseini's efforts to acquire German backing for Arab independence, Hitler refused to support them, remarking that he "wanted nothing from the Arabs". Nazi Germany was reluctant to initiate disputes with the Italian Empire or Vichy France colonies.^[15]

In the last will and testament of Adolf Hitler, Hitler complained that Italy's colonies in the Libya and East Africa damaged the credibility of the Axis powers as an anti-colonial force:

Our Italian ally has been a source of embarrassment to us everywhere.. ... Had we been on our own, we could have emancipated the Moslem countries dominated by France; and that would have had enormous repercussions in the Near East, dominated by Britain, and in Egypt. But with our fortunes linked to those of the Italians, the pursuit of such a policy was not possible. All Islam vibrated at the news of our victories.... Just think what we could have done to help them, even to incite them, as would have been both our duty and in our own interest! But the presence of the Italians at our side paralysed us; it created a feeling of malaise among our Islamic friends, who inevitably saw in us accomplices, willing or unwilling, of their oppressors. For the Italians in these parts of the world are more bitterly hated ... The memories of the barbarous, reprisals taken against the Senussi are still vivid. .... We had a great chance of pursuing a splendid policy with regard to Islam. But we missed the bus, as we missed it on several other occasions, thanks to our loyalty to the Italian alliance! ... the effects of our policy were doubly disastrous. On the one hand we had wounded, with no advantage to ourselves, the self esteem of the French. On the other hand this, of itself, compelled us to maintain the domination exercised by the French over their empire, for fear that the contagion might spread to Italian North Africa and that the latter might then also claim its independence. And since all these territories are now occupied by the Anglo-Americans, I am more than justified in saying that this policy of ours was a disaster. Further, this futile policy has allowed these hypocrites, the British, to pose, if you please, as liberators in Syria, in Cyrenaica and in Tripolitania!^[16]