S.L.A. Marshall | |
---|---|
Nickname(s) | Slam |
Born | Catskill, New York, U.S. | July 18, 1900
Died | 17 December 1977 El Paso, Texas, U.S. | (aged 77)
Place of burial | |
Allegiance | United States of America |
Service | United States Army |
Years of service | 1917–1960 (non-consecutive) |
Rank | Brigadier General |
Unit | 90th Infantry Division (WWI) Eighth Army (Korean War) |
Battles / wars | World War I St Mihiel; Meuse-Argonne Offensive; World War II Korean War |
Awards | Legion of Merit Bronze Star Medal (2) Combat Infantryman Badge |
Other work | author journalist |
Brigadier General Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall (July 18, 1900 – December 17, 1977), also known as SLAM, was a military journalist and historian. He served with the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I, before becoming a journalist, specialising in military affairs.
In 1940, he published Blitzkrieg: Armies on Wheels, an analysis of the tactics used by the Wehrmacht, and re-entered the U.S. Army as its chief combat historian during World War II and the Korean War. He officially retired in 1960 but acted as an unofficial advisor and historian during the Vietnam War. In total, Marshall wrote over 30 books, including Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action, later made into a film of the same name, as well as The Vietnam Primer, co-authored by Colonel David H. Hackworth.
His most famous publication is Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command, which claimed that fewer than 25% of men in combat actually fired their weapons at the enemy. While the data used to support this has been challenged, his conclusions and suggested remedies to improve combat effectiveness have been influential.[1]
Why is this? so remains unknown. Marshall argued that even with their own lives at risk, the resistance of the average individual “...toward killing a fellow man" was such that "he will not...take life if it is possible to turn away from that responsibility and at the vital point, he becomes a conscientious objector".[2] Others argue so-called 'low fire' is a function of training and discipline, and is a positive attribute.[3] These debates continue since understanding is crucial to overcoming them through training, as well as dealing with actual or potential combat-stress disorder.