SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. | |
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Court | United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit |
Argued | March 20, 1967 |
Decided | August 13, 1968 |
Citation | 401 F.2d 833; 2 A.L.R. Fed. 190 |
Case history | |
Prior history | SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F.Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) |
Subsequent history | Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (denying certiorari); Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (denying certiorari) |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Waterman |
Concurrence | Friendly |
Concurrence | Kaufman |
Concurrence | Anderson |
Concur/dissent | Hays |
Dissent | Moore, joined by Lumbard |
Laws applied | |
Section 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act; SEC Rule 10b-5 |
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.[1] is a case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which articulated standards for a number of aspects of insider trading law under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5. In particular, it set out standards for materiality of inside information, effective disclosure of such information, and what constitutes a "misleading" statement. Texas Gulf Sulphur represented the first time a federal court held that insider trading violated federal securities law and remained the leading case on insider trading for a decade.[2] Over time, the U.S. Supreme Court embraced some of its holdings while rejecting others. The case continues to receive significant scholarly attention.