Schmerber v. California

Schmerber v. California
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued April 25, 1966
Decided June 20, 1966
Full case nameArmando Schmerber, Petitioner v. State of California
Citations384 U.S. 757 (more)
86 S. Ct. 1826; 16 L. Ed. 2d 908; 1966 U.S. LEXIS 1129
Case history
PriorCertiorari to the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles
Holding
  1. The forced extraction and analysis of a blood sample is not compelled testimony and therefore does not violate the Fifth Amendment Right against self-incrimination
  2. Intrusions into the human body require a warrant
  3. Here, the warrantless blood test was permissible under the exigent circumstances exception to prevent the destruction of alcohol in the blood stream through the body's natural metabolic processes
Court membership
Chief Justice
Earl Warren
Associate Justices
Hugo Black · William O. Douglas
Tom C. Clark · John M. Harlan II
William J. Brennan Jr. · Potter Stewart
Byron White · Abe Fortas
Case opinions
MajorityBrennan, joined by Clark, Harlan, Stewart, White
ConcurrenceHarlan, joined by Stewart
DissentWarren
DissentBlack, joined by Douglas
DissentDouglas
DissentFortas
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amends. IV, V, VI, XIV

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), was a landmark[1] United States Supreme Court case in which the Court clarified the application of the Fourth Amendment's protection against warrantless searches and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination for searches that intrude into the human body. Until Schmerber, the Supreme Court had not yet clarified whether state police officers must procure a search warrant before taking blood samples from criminal suspects. Likewise, the Court had not yet clarified whether blood evidence taken against the wishes of a criminal suspect may be used against that suspect in the course of a criminal prosecution.[fn 1]

In a 5–4 opinion, the Court held that forced extraction and analysis of a blood sample is not compelled testimony; therefore, it does not violate the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.[5] The Court also held that intrusions into the human body ordinarily require a search warrant.[6] However, the Court ruled that the involuntary, warrantless blood sample taken in this case was justified under the Fourth Amendment's exigent circumstances exception because evidence of blood alcohol would be destroyed by the body's natural metabolic processes if the officers were to wait for a warrant.[7] In 2013, the Supreme Court clarified in Missouri v. McNeely that the natural metabolism of alcohol in the bloodstream is not a per se exigency that would always justify warrantless blood tests of individuals suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol.[8]

In the years following the Court's decision in Schmerber, many legal scholars feared the ruling would be used to limit civil liberties.[9] Other scholars, including Nita A. Farahany, Benjamin Holley, and John G. New, have suggested courts may use the ruling in Schmerber to justify the use of mind reading devices against criminal suspects.[10] Because the Court's ruling in Schmerber prohibited the use of warrantless blood tests in most circumstances, some commentators argue that the decision was responsible for the proliferation of breathalyzers to test for alcohol and urine analyses to test for controlled substances in criminal investigations.[11]

  1. ^ Aron Hogden, Reconciling A Split of Authority: A South Dakota Response to Recent Developments in Drunk Driving Law, 59 S.D. L. Rev. 372, 373 (2014) (describing Schmerber v. California as a "landmark case"); see also Kelsey P. Black, Undue Protection Versus Undue Punishment: Examining the Drinking & Driving Problem Across the United States, 40 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 463, 469 (2007) (describing Schmerber v. California as a "watershed case" in the nation's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
  2. ^ Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957).
  3. ^ Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 439.
  4. ^ See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
  5. ^ Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966).
  6. ^ Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
  7. ^ Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 ("in the present case, however, [the officer] might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence") (internal quotations omitted).
  8. ^ Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013).
  9. ^ Kelsey P. Black, Undue Protection Versus Undue Punishment: Examining the Drinking & Driving Problem Across the United States, 40 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 463, 478–79 (2007).
  10. ^ Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 351, 355 (2012); Benjamin Holley, It's All in Your Head: Neurotechnological Lie Detection & the Fourth & Fifth Amendments, 28 Dev. Mental Health L. 1, 18 (2009); John G. New, If You Could Read My Mind: Implications of Neurological Evidence for Twenty-First Century Criminal Jurisprudence, 29 J. Legal Med. 179, 197 (2008); cf. Kiel Brennan-Marquez, A Modest Defense of Mind Reading, 15 Yale J. L. & Tech. 214 (2013) ("The modern era of self-incrimination jurisprudence began with Schmerber v. California.").
  11. ^ See, e.g., John A. Scanlan, Jr., Playing the Drug-Testing Game: College Athletes, Regulatory Institutions, & the Structures of Constitutional Argument, 62 Ind. L.J. 863, 907 (1987); Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772, 776–77 (1982) (discussing impacts of the Court's ruling in Schmerber on "the breathalyzer test").


Cite error: There are <ref group=fn> tags on this page, but the references will not show without a {{reflist|group=fn}} template (see the help page).