The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) was a British policy document produced in July 1998 by the Labour Government that had gained power a year previously. Then Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson, set out the initial defence policy of the new government, with a series of key decisions designed to enhance the United Kingdom's armed forces.
Two of the largest defence procurement projects were excluded from the 1998 SDR, the Vanguard-class Trident submarines and the Eurofighter. However the Trident system was essential to maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent, a policy adopted by Labour, and was already nearing completion. Likewise the Eurofighter was nearing production and withdrawal would lead to loss of considerable investment and severe penalties from the partner nations.
Its overall strategic conclusions were that the British Armed Forces should be able to respond to a major international crisis which might require a military effort and combat operations of a similar scale and duration to Operation Granby during the Gulf War. It also should be able to undertake a more extended overseas deployment on a lesser scale (as in Bosnia) while retaining the ability to mount a second substantial deployment - which might involve a combat brigade and appropriate naval and air forces - if this were made necessary by a second crisis (as in Operation Veritas in Afghanistan). It would not, however, expect both deployments to involve warfighting or to maintain them simultaneously for longer than six months. The Armed Forces must also retain the ability, at much longer notice, to rebuild a bigger (pre-Options for Change) force as part of NATO's collective defence should a major strategic threat re-emerge.
The next wholesale review of the British Armed Forces was the Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2010.