Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill | |
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Argued April 18, 1978 Decided June 15, 1978 | |
Full case name | Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, et al. |
Citations | 437 U.S. 153 (more) |
Argument | Oral argument |
Case history | |
Prior | Injunction denied, 419 F. Supp. 753, 757 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), reversed, 549 F.2d 1064, 1069 (6th Cir. 1977). TVA petitioned for Writ of Certiorari from U.S. Supreme Court which was granted in November 1977. |
Subsequent | 84 F.R.D. 226 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) |
Holding | |
Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit judgement and ordered an injunction against the completion of the Tellico Dam citing the project impact would violate provisions stated in Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Burger, joined by Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Stevens |
Dissent | Powell, joined by Blackmun |
Dissent | Rehnquist |
Laws applied | |
Endangered Species Act |
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hiram Hill et al., or TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), was a United States Supreme Court case and the Court's first interpretation of the Endangered Species Act of 1973. After the discovery of the snail darter fish in the Little Tennessee River in August 1973, a lawsuit was filed alleging that the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)'s Tellico Dam construction was in violation of the Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs argued dam construction would destroy critical habitat and endanger the population of snail darters. It was decided by a 6-3 vote, in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Hill, et al. and granted an injunction stating that there would be conflict between Tellico Dam operation and the explicit provisions of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.
The majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, affirmed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in granting an injunction.[1] This decision by the Supreme Court to not allow exemptions confirmed that Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act was a strong substantive provision and helped shape federal environmental law.[2] The case is commonly cited as an example of the strict construction-plain meaning canon of construction, and the equitable principle that courts cannot balance equities to override statutory mandates unless on constitutional grounds.