Terry v. Ohio

Terry v. Ohio
Argued December 12, 1967
Decided June 10, 1968
Full case nameJohn W. Terry, et al. v. State of Ohio
Citations392 U.S. 1 (more)
88 S. Ct. 1868; 20 L. Ed. 2d 889; 1968 U.S. LEXIS 1345; 44 Ohio Op. 2d 383
ArgumentOral argument
Case history
PriorDefendant's motion to suppress evidence denied, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 489 (1964); defendant convicted, 95 Ohio L. Abs. 321 (Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County 1964); affirmed, 214 N.E.2d 114 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966); review denied, Ohio Supreme Court, November 19, 1966; cert. granted, 387 U.S. 929 (1967).
Holding
Police may stop a person if they have a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may frisk the suspect for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous, without violating the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Earl Warren
Associate Justices
Hugo Black · William O. Douglas
John M. Harlan II · William J. Brennan Jr.
Potter Stewart · Byron White
Abe Fortas · Thurgood Marshall
Case opinions
MajorityWarren, joined by Black, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White, Fortas, Marshall
ConcurrenceHarlan
ConcurrenceWhite
DissentDouglas
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the court ruled that it is constitutional for American police to "stop and frisk" a person they reasonably suspect to be armed and involved in a crime. Specifically, the decision held that a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures when questioning someone even though the officer lacks probable cause to arrest the person, so long as the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.[1] The court also ruled that the police officer may perform a quick surface search of the person's outer clothing for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is "armed and presently dangerous." This reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts," and not merely upon an officer's hunch.

This permitted police action has subsequently been referred to in short as a "stop and frisk", "stop, question, and frisk," or simply a "Terry stop." The Terry standard was later extended to temporary detentions of persons in vehicles, known as traffic stops; see Terry stop for a summary of subsequent jurisprudence. The rationale behind the Supreme Court decision revolves around the notion that, as the opinion argues, "the exclusionary rule has its limitations." According to the court, the meaning of the rule is to protect persons from unreasonable searches and seizures aimed at gathering evidence, not searches and seizures for other purposes (like prevention of crime or personal protection of police officers).[citation needed]

Legal scholars have criticized this ruling stating that "the people's constitutional right against the use of abusive police power" has been sacrificed in favor of a "police-purported need for a workable tool short of probable cause to use in temporary investigatory detentions."[2] Critics also state that it has led to negative legislative outcomes and permitting instances of racial profiling.[2]

  1. ^ Katz, Lewis R. "Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View". Miss. L.J.
  2. ^ a b "Terry v. Ohio: Its Failure, Immoral Progeny, and Racial Profiling". June 23, 2023. Archived from the original on June 23, 2023. Retrieved February 8, 2024.