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| United States v. Haggar Apparel Co. | |
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| Argued January 11, 1999 Decided April 21, 1999 | |
| Full case name | United States v. Haggar Apparel Company |
| Citations | 526 U.S. 380 (more) 119 S. Ct. 1392; 143 L. Ed. 2d 480 |
| Holding | |
| The statutes authorizing customs classification regulations are consistent with the usual rule that regulations of an administering agency warrant judicial deference applied under Chevron analysis. | |
| Court membership | |
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| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Kennedy, joined by unanimous (parts I, II, III); Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Breyer (part IV). |
| Concur/dissent | Stevens, joined by Ginsburg |
| Laws applied | |
| 19 CFR § 10.16; 19 U.S.C. § 1202 | |
United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999), is a United States Supreme Court holding that Chevron deference is appropriate for regulations issued by Customs on behalf of the Treasury. The statutes authorizing customs classification regulations were found consistent with the usual rule that regulations of an administering agency warrant judicial deference; and nothing in the regulation in question persuaded the Court that the Customs and Border Patrol intended the regulation to have some lesser force and effect. The statutory scheme did not support the importer's argument that the regulation only applied to customs officers themselves as opposed to the adjudication of importers' refund suits in the Court of International Trade. The Customs Service (which is within the US Treasury Department) is charged with fixing duties applicable to imported goods under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.