| United States v. More | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued February 6, 1805 Decided March 2, 1805 | |
| Full case name | United States v. Benjamin More |
| Citations | 7 U.S. 159 (more) |
| Case history | |
| Prior | Demurrer to indictment sustained (C.C.D.C. 1803) |
| Subsequent | None |
| Holding | |
| The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to hear writs of error from the circuit courts in criminal cases | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinion | |
| Majority | Marshall, joined by unanimous |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; District of Columbia Organic Act of 1801 | |
United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159 (1805), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that it had no jurisdiction to hear appeals from criminal cases in the circuit courts by writs of error. Relying on the Exceptions Clause, More held that Congress's enumerated grants of appellate jurisdiction to the Court operated as an exercise of Congress's power to eliminate all other forms of appellate jurisdiction.
The second of forty-one criminal cases heard by the Marshall Court, More ensured that the Court's criminal jurisprudence would be limited to writs of error from the state (and later, territorial) courts, original habeas petitions and writs of error from habeas petitions in the circuit courts, and certificates of division and mandamus from the circuit courts. Congress did not grant the Court jurisdiction to hear writs of error from the circuit courts in criminal cases until 1889, for capital crimes, and 1891, for other "infamous" crimes.[1] The Judicial Code of 1911 abolished the circuit courts, transferred the trial of crimes to the district courts, and extended the Court's appellate jurisdiction to all crimes.[1] But, these statutory grants were construed not to permit writs of error filed by the prosecution, as in More.[2]
More arose from the same Federalist/Jeffersonian political dispute over the judiciary that gave rise to Marbury v. Madison (1803) and Stuart v. Laird (1803). Benjamin More, a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia, argued that the repeal of statutory provisions authorizing compensation for his office violated the salary-protection guarantees for federal judges in Article Three of the United States Constitution. Below, a divided panel of the United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia had sided with More, interpreted the repeal act prospectively, and sustained his demurrer to the criminal indictment for the common law crime of exacting illegal fees under color of office.
- ^ a b Brent D. Stratton, Criminal Law: The Attenuation Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: A Study in Attenuated Principle and Dissipated Logic, 75 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 139, 139 n.1 (1984).
- ^ Rossman, 1990, at 524 n.19 (citing United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892)).