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Top row: Pro-Russian paramilitaries in Donbas. Middle: Aftermath of the Battle of Donetsk Airport; damaged buildings in Spartak. Bottom: Ukrainian T-64BV tank during the Battle of Debaltseve; Donbas Battalion soldiers on a BTR-60 in the Donbas, August 2014.
Date
12 April 2014 (2014-04-12)[4][5][6][7] – 24 February 2022 (2022-02-24)[b][dubious – discuss] (7 years, 10 months, 2 weeks and 4 days)
In March 2014, following Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity, anti-revolution and pro-Russian protests began in Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhanskoblasts, collectively 'the Donbas'. These began as Russia invaded Crimea. Armed Russian-backed separatists seized Ukrainian government buildings and declared the Donetsk and Luhansk republics (DPR and LPR) as independent states, leading to conflict with Ukrainian forces.[25] Russia covertly supported the separatists with troops and weaponry. It only admitted sending "military specialists",[26][27] but later acknowledged the separatists as Russian combat veterans.[28] In April 2014, Ukraine launched a counter-offensive, called the "Anti-Terrorist Operation"[29] (ATO), later renamed the "Joint Forces Operation" (JFO).[30][31] By August 2014, Ukraine had re-taken most separatist-held territory and nearly regained control of the Russia–Ukraine border.[32] In response, Russia covertly sent troops, tanks and artillery into the Donbas.[33][34][35] The Russian incursion helped pro-Russian forces regain much of the territory they had lost.[30][36][37]
Ukraine, Russia, the DPR and LPR signed a ceasefire agreement, the Minsk Protocol, in September 2014.[38] Ceasefire breaches became rife, 29 in all,[39] and heavy fighting resumed in January 2015, during which the separatists captured Donetsk Airport. A new ceasefire, Minsk II, was agreed on 12 February 2015. Immediately after, separatists renewed their offensive on Debaltseve and forced Ukraine's military to withdraw.[40] Skirmishes continued but the front line did not change. Both sides fortified their position by building networks of trenches, bunkers and tunnels, resulting in static trench warfare.[41][42] Stalemate led to the war being called a "frozen conflict",[43] but Donbas remained a war zone, with dozens killed monthly.[44] In 2017, on average a Ukrainian soldier died every three days,[45] with an estimated 40,000 separatist and 6,000 Russian troops in the region.[46][47] By the end of 2017, OSCE observers had counted around 30,000 people in military gear crossing from Russia at the two border checkpoints it was allowed to monitor,[48] and documented military convoys crossing from Russia covertly.[49] All sides agreed to a roadmap for ending the war in October 2019,[50] but it remained unresolved.[51][52] During 2021, Ukrainian fatalities rose sharply and Russian forces massed around Ukraine's borders.[53] Russia recognized the DPR and LPR as independent states on 21 February 2022 and deployed troops to those territories. On 24 February, Russia began a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, subsuming the war in Donbas into it.
About 14,000 people were killed in the war: 6,500 Russian and Russian proxy forces, 4,400 Ukrainian forces, and 3,400 civilians on both sides.[17] Most civilian casualties were in the first year.[17]
^Galeotti, Mark; Hook, Adam (2019). Windrow, Martin (ed.). Armies of Russia's war in Ukraine. Elite. Oxford New York: Osprey Publishing. pp. 14–16. ISBN978-1-4728-3345-7.
^ abMitrokhin, Nikolay (2021). "Infiltration, Instruction, Invasion: Russia's War in the Donbas". In Hauter, Jakob; Wilson, Andrew (eds.). Civil war? Interstate war? Hybrid war? dimensions and interpretations of the Donbas Conflict in 2014-2020. Soviet and post-Soviet politics and society. Stuttgart: ibidem Verlag. p. 115. ISBN978-3-8382-7383-9.
^ abArel, Dominique; Driscoll, Jesse, eds. (2023), "Ukraine's Unnamed War", Ukraine's Unnamed War: Before the Russian Invasion of 2022, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. i–ii, ISBN978-1-316-51149-7, retrieved 23 September 2023
^Galeotti, Mark; Hook, Adam (2019). Windrow, Martin (ed.). Armies of Russia's war in Ukraine. Elite. Oxford New York: Osprey Publishing. pp. 14–16. ISBN978-1-4728-3345-7.
^Mitrokhin, Nikolay (2021). "Infiltration, Instruction, Invasion: Russia's War in the Donbas". In Hauter, Jakob; Wilson, Andrew (eds.). Civil war? Interstate war? Hybrid war? dimensions and interpretations of the Donbas Conflict in 2014-2020. Soviet and post-Soviet politics and society. Stuttgart: ibidem Verlag. p. 115. ISBN978-3-8382-7383-9.
^Galeotti, Mark; Hook, Adam (2019). Windrow, Martin (ed.). Armies of Russia's war in Ukraine. Elite. Oxford New York, NY: Osprey Publishing. pp. 14–16. ISBN978-1-4728-3345-7.
^The Interpreter quoted what Putin said during a live call-in session on 12 October 2016: "When we were forced, I want to stress, forced to defend the Russian-speaking population in the Donbas, forced to respond to the desire of the people living in Crimea to return to being part of the Russian Federation, they instantly began to whip up anti-Russian policies and the imposition of sanctions." "Putin Claims Russia Was 'Forced To Defend Russian-Speaking Population in Donbass'". The Interpreter. 12 October 2016. Retrieved 8 January 2018.
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^Cite error: The named reference 56678665Ukraineconflict was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
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