Whren v. United States | |
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Argued April 17, 1996 Decided June 10, 1996 | |
Full case name | Michael A. Whren and James L. Brown, Petitioners, v. United States |
Citations | 517 U.S. 806 (more) 116 S. Ct. 1769; 135 L. Ed. 2d 89; 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3720 |
Case history | |
Prior | Conviction affirmed, United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371 (D.C. Cir. 1995); cert. granted, 516 U.S. 1036 (1996). |
Subsequent | Conviction affirmed on remand, United States v. Whren, 111 F.3d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1997); cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1119 (1998). |
Holding | |
Any traffic offense committed by a driver is a legitimate legal basis for a traffic stop. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinion | |
Majority | Scalia, joined by unanimous |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. IV |
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), was a unanimous United States Supreme Court decision[1] that "declared that any traffic offense committed by a driver was a legitimate legal basis for a stop."[2]
In an opinion authored by Antonin Scalia, the court held that a search and seizure is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment in cases where the police officers have a "reasonable suspicion" that a traffic violation has occurred. The personal, or subjective, motives of an officer are not a factor in the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis of whether the cause for a stop is sufficient. The standard for reasonable suspicion is purely an objective one.[3][1]
A major concern with this case's ruling is that police conducting traffic stops may racially profile the stopped persons.[4] Similar to the controversy around New York City's Stop and Frisk program, some believe that the ruling in Whren will lead to an increase in racial profiling towards young African American males.[5]